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I. INTRODUCTION
Over seventy-five years ago, Aldous Huxley envisioned a future in which the
creation of human individuals is not left to chance and sweaty biology, but is a feat
of engineering individuals to established specifications.2 Huxley described a process

1
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 5, sc. 8. Macbeth describes the prophecy by
which he cannot be killed by any man “of woman born.” Macduff thwarts the prophecy,
exclaiming that he was “from his mother’s womb, untimely ripp’d,” i.e., born by Caesarian
section, the earliest precursor to the concept of ectogenesis.
+
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, ‘10. There are several people without whom this
paper would not have happened: David Stein, for last minute brilliance. Kathryn Kramer,
without whom this would be a disorganized rant on a paper napkin. Ben Chojnacki & the rest
of the 2009-2010 Journal Editorial Board. And always, my parents, Stuart & Mindi Steiger.
2

ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 1 (Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2006)
(1932), available at http://www.huxley.net/bnw/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2008).
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by which human ova are fertilized in-vitro, then “budded” through an imaginary
technique into multiple copies, and finally grown into identical twins in incubators,
entirely absent of a mother’s womb.3 While many of Huxley’s predictions about the
future have come to pass, such as helicopters, the assembly line, and indeed, in-vitro
fertilization, the prospect of ectogenesis, of gestating a child completely outside of
its mother’s uterus, is still within the realm of science fiction.4 However, that may
not be the case for much longer.
Scientists predict that safe, reliable, and complete ectogenesis will be available
within the next thirty years, and perhaps within as little as ten or five.5 Researchers
have already achieved great strides towards this goal, developing a microfluidic chip
that mimics the biological process of fertilization, making in-vitro fertilization more
successful,6 and successfully keeping fetal goats alive for weeks using an artificial
placenta.7 While it is unquestionably a matter of years before the technology exists
to gestate complete human beings ectogenetically, the legal questions surrounding
such a process are complex enough to require consideration sooner, rather than later.
One of the most interesting legal questions presented by the advent of
ectogenesis is that of “personhood.” Under the United States Constitution, citizens
are defined by having been “born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof.”8 A child of ectogenesis, having never been carried in a
uterus, would never be born in the traditional sense.9 Huxley’s term “decanting”
seems more appropriate.10 While statutory modification should never be undertaken
lightly, it appears that simple (by federal standards) legislation could close this
particular loophole when the time comes to recognize fully mature ectogenetic
infants as having been “born.”

3

Id.

4

For a partial list of examples of ectogenesis in science fiction, see http://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Artificial_uterus (last visited Feb. 13, 2009). While many examples also
include parthenogenesis (female reproduction without male fertilization), cloning
(reproduction of an individual genetically identical to the parent), genetic engineering
(modifying the genetic structure of an organism), and other possible future developments in
reproductive science, this note will be limited to the topic of gestating otherwise-normal
human fetuses outside the natural womb.
5

Jeremy Laurance, The Future of Fertility, THE INDEPENDENT (London), July 17, 2008.

6

New Medical Findings Reported by University of Tokyo Researchers, LIFE SCIENCE
WEEKLY, Sep. 11, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 17436188.
7

Sakata, Hisano, et. al., A new artificial placenta with a centrifugal pump, 46 THORACIC
CARDIOVASCULAR SURGEON 1023 (1998). See also Sacha Zimmerman, Technology’s
Threat to Abortion Rights, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 2003 at D3; Scott Gelfand, Are We Ready
for an Artificial Womb?, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 3, 2002.

AND

8

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

9

“Birth: The complete extrusion of a newborn baby from the mother's body.” BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
10

HUXLEY, supra note 2, at 5.
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However, far more nuanced questions are raised by a fetus’s status prior to
decanting.11 The United States Supreme Court has expressly declined to consider
fetuses as people, denying them protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.12
Traditionally, a fetus’s protection, especially that of one not developed enough to be
viable outside the womb, has been inextricably entwined with that of its mother.13 In
recent years, however, fetuses, and even embryos, have been granted certain
independent protections, such as restrictions on abortions, and in some cases going
so far as to be statutorily defined as people between in-vitro fertilization and
implantation.14
Functional ectogenesis will require a reexamination of the status of developing
embryos and fetuses in several important ways: medically, ethically, socially, and
legally.15 Paramount to this consideration is the development of a fetus into
“personhood,” such that it gains protections under the law.16 Under the current law,
11

Under current scientific nomenclature, a fetus is the appropriate term for an immature
human at any stage of development between eight weeks from fertilization and birth. While
the development of an embryo into a fetus is a continuous process taking place over the first
eight weeks of gestation, for the purposes of the law and this paper it is necessary to
distinguish between the two concepts. While an “embryo” technically refers only to a zygote
between two and eight weeks of development, the term has been extended to include any
fertilized egg prior to the fetal stage, including those frozen and awaiting implantation. For
the sake of simplicity and consistency, this Article will refer to all pre-fetal entities as
embryos.
12

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).

13

See Keeler v. Super. Ct., 2 Cal. 3d 619 (1970) (holding that a fetus was not a “human
being” as contemplated by the California statute defining murder at the time, despite a 96%
chance of viability outside the womb).
14
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:121-133 (2008) (defining in-vitro fertilized human
embryos as “juridical persons,” and restricting their use solely to preparation for implantation
in-utero). To date, Louisiana is the only state that has extended juridical personhood to
embryos, and it is largely unclear what effect this categorization may have on the abortion
debate or on future ectogenetic developments. For a complete description of the statute and its
development, see Jeanne Louise Carriere, From Status to Person in Book 1, Title 1 of the Civil
Code, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1263, 1263-86 (1999).
15

The legal, social, ethical, and philosophical questions brought on by ectogenetic
technology far outstrip the ability of any one article to adequately address them. In 1923, the
technology of ectogenesis was lauded as one of the most important biological discoveries
mankind could make, alongside the domestications of animals, plants, and yeasts and the (at
the time) future development of bactericides. J.B.S. HALDANE, DAEDALUS REVISITED 23-50
(Krishna R. Dronamraju ed., Oxford University Press 1994) (1923). The social implications
alone surrounding the possibility of eliminating pregnancy are staggeringly far-reaching and
complex, and numerous works have attempted to address them in myriad ways. The legal
questions encompass areas of biomedical ethics, parental rights, genetic engineering and DNA
rights, and privacy, to name but a few. In spite of the breadth of subjects upon which
ectogenesis potentially has an impact, this paper will be limited to the still-massive questions
of how ectogenesis affects the point at which a fetus becomes a person for the purposes of
legal protection and what status it has before then.
16

See, generally Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for
Legal Personhood, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 369 (2007) [hereinafter Berg, Elephants and Embryos].
Berg explores the qualifications and ramifications of legal personhood for several different
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a fetus is considered a person once it becomes viable outside the womb, subject to
certain exceptions.17 However, the fundamental point of ectogenesis is that it renders
a fetus “viable,” albeit with technological assistance, from the moment of
fertilization.18 As such, the legal definition of viability will need to be adapted to
conform with ectogenetic technology.19 Ironically, the only sensible way to define
viability without dismantling the current rights to abortion is by returning to the
bright-line standard of development established in Roe v. Wade.20 While the rigid
trimester system of Roe has been overturned,21 Congress must, with the help of the
medical profession, establish a point during fetal development at which the fetus is
considered “viable,” and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furthermore, while a pre-viable fetus in utero is not considered a person, it does
carry protection, both in the form of fetal protection statutes and by virtue of the
protection granted to the mother.22 In order to maintain equality between a previable ectogenetic fetus and one carried in the womb, legal protections must be

types of entities, including embryos, fetuses, animals, and artificial intelligences. Berg argues
that natural personhood designations are extremely limited, and juridical personhood options
should be explored as a function of a being’s interest in having legal protection. Id. at 406.
One of the points Berg argues most relevant here is the introduction of degrees of personhood.
“[N]ot all juridical persons will necessarily have the same legal rights. The rationale for
restricting juridical persons’ rights based on the justification for granting them arises from the
impact on existing persons’ rights.” Id. at 380. Establishing degrees of personhood to a fetus
over the course of its development is consistent with modern decisions regarding abortion.
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), upholding a restriction on certain abortions of
previable fetuses.
17
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870 (1992), reaffirming
viability as the threshold point for abortion, before which the State’s interests in preserving
fetal life do not justify a prohibition on abortion. But see Carhart, 550 U.S. at 171, upholding
the Federal Partial Birth Abortion Ban, 18 U.S.C. § 1531(a) (2000), despite the lack of
distinction in the statute between previability & postviability. Carhart “blurs the line, firmly
drawn in Casey, between previability and postviability abortions.” Id. at 171. Carhart
stretches the definition of viable by noting that “a fetus is a living organism while within the
womb, whether or not it is viable outside the womb.” Id. at 186. “Instead of drawing the line
at viability, the Court refers to Congress' purpose to differentiate "abortion and infanticide"
based not on whether a fetus can survive outside the womb, but on where a fetus is
anatomically located when a particular medical procedure is performed.” Id.
18

Hyun Jee Son, Artificial Wombs, Frozen Embryos, and Abortion: Reconciling
Viability’s Doctrinal Ambiguity, 14 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 213 (2005). Son uses ectogenesis to
explore the vulnerabilities in the viability standard arising from the ambiguity of the term
“viable.” Id. at 215.
19

Id.

20

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

21

Casey, 505 U.S. 833.

22

See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.08 (2008) (extending Ohio homicide laws
to include “causing the unlawful termination of another’s pregnancy”). Fetal homicide is
specifically defined as to include the entire period between fertilization and birth, and to
exclude lawful abortions and accident on the part of the pregnant woman herself. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2903.09 (2008).
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established to safeguard a developing ectogenetic baby.23 These protections must
accurately derive from existing fetal development law, and account for both the
state’s interest in protecting nascent life, and the parents’ interests in maintaining
control over their potential offspring.24 In establishing these protections, it becomes
necessary to determine exactly what legal status a pre-viable developing fetus
actually has: while the Roe Court has ruled that it cannot be a person,25 courts and
legislatures have granted and upheld rights and protections for a developing fetus far
beyond those normally extended to personal property.26 If a fetus in utero is “quasiproperty,” somewhere between a person and a chattel, it is important to know exactly
what rights and protections are to be applied to it, and why, so that similar rights and
protections can be applied to a fetus developing ectogenetically.27
This note will provide an overview of the concept of ectogenesis, the current
state of the science and law involved, and some broad predictions about the need for
change in the law to accommodate scientific developments in the near future. Part II
will explore the origins of ectogenesis in literature and examine the current state of
the debate, as well as the current state of medical progress towards a working
artificial womb. It will also examine some of the reasons for and against ectogenetic
development. Part III will examine the current law regarding fetal status and legal
personhood before birth. Part IV will apply the law as it is currently situated to a
future in which ectogenesis is commonplace, and examine the problems that arise as
a result. Part V will propose changes in the law to accommodate for such a future.
Part VI will address potential problems that may occur as a result of those changes,
and suggest possible solutions to those problems.
II. HISTORICAL AND MEDICAL BACKGROUND
Ectogenesis is the complete development of a mammalian fetus in an artificial
uterus.28 This process is thought to still be decades away from fruition, but
breakthroughs in medical and neonatal technology are bringing it closer to a reality.29
Reproductive therapy is one of the most lucrative forms of medical practice, and

23

Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16 at 398.
In utero fetuses have the ancillary protections of their mother’s legal personhood. But
ex utero fetuses would not have these protections. While parental property interests
would function and may provide a basis for decision making and control, we may well
need the additional identification of the developing ex utero fetus as a separate legal
actor. As artificial womb technology advances, this question should receive more
thought and analysis.
Id.
24

Id.

25

Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.

26

§§ 2903.01-2903.08.

27

Jessica Berg, Owning Persons: the Application of Property Theory to Embryos and
Fetuses, 40 Wake FOREST L. REV. 159 (2005) [hereinafter Berg, Owning Persons].
28
29

HALDANE, supra note 15.

Scientists Could Let a 100yo Give Birth, SUNDAY TERRITORIAN (Australia), Oct. 12,
2008, at 44.
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technology enabling more consistent and convenient reproduction is constantly being
refined.30
The earliest known proposal for an ectogenetic process comes from the 16th
century occultist Paracelsus.31 Paracelsus’s formula involved creating a
“homunculus” by sealing semen in the womb of a horse and allowing it to “putrefy
for forty days” on a diet of human blood.32 The process’s success rate has never
been documented, but seems dubious.
The modern ectogenesis debate began during the 1920s in the arena of pulp
science fiction magazines.33 The editors of magazines such as Amazing Stories often
published the latest research of the time, and specifically tied their fiction into the
current trends.34 The beginnings and early advances in the sciences of genetics and
tissue culture spawned the earliest debates on reproductive technology, including
cloning, genetic engineering, and ectogenesis.35 The term “ectogenesis” first appears
in J.B.S. Haldane’s “Daedalus, or Science and the Future.”36 Haldane proposes

30

See Anna Mulrine, Making Babies, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sept. 19, 2004,
available at http://health.usnews.com/usnews/health/articles/040927/27babies_2.htm (last
visited: Feb. 15, 2009). In 2004, over one billion dollars was spent on IVF (In Vitro
Fertilization) therapy. Id. Reproductive therapy has been in the news again lately as a result
of the octuplets born to Nadya Suleman on January 26, 2008. Scott LaFee, Octopulet Case
Sparks Calls for Fertility-Industry Curbs, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 12, 2009,
available
at:
http://www3.signonsandiego.com/stories/2009/feb/12/1n12births233821octuplet-case-sparks-calls-fertil/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). Suleman’s are the second set of
octuplets born in the United States, both through IVF therapy. Id. With six prior children, also
through IVF, and currently living on government assistance, Suleman has become a symbol of
the need for regulation and oversight of fertility therapy in the United States. Id.
31

Scott Gelfand, Introduction, in ECTOGENESIS: ARTIFICIAL WOMB TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FUTURE OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION 1, 3 (Scott Gelfand & John R. Shook eds., Rodopi 2006)
[hereinafter GELFAND & SHOOK, ECTOGENESIS].
32

AUROLEUS PHILLIPUS THEOPHRASTUS BOMBASTUS VON HOHENHEIM, AKA PARACELSUS,
Concerning the Nature of Things, in THE HERMETIC AND ALCHEMICAL WRITINGS OF
PARACELSUS, VOL. 1, 124 (Arthur E. Waite ed., University Books 1967).
33
See generally SUSAN MERRILL SQUIER, BABIES IN BOTTLES (Rutgers Univ. Press 1994)
(providing a detailed history of ectogenesis in twentieth-century fiction).
34

Id.

35

Id.

36

Scott LaFee, Will Artificial Wombs Mean the End of Pregnancy?, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/science/20040
225-9999-mz1c25womb.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). The concept of ectogenesis has
been given different names over the course of the near-century since it was introduced. These
include artificial uteruses, synthetic wombs, and uterine replicators. For the purpose of this
Article, I will refer primarily to “ectogenetic fetuses” and “fetuses developing
ectogenetically,” as opposed to fetuses developing naturally, or in utero. Any reference to
other terms is a result of their use in source text. Additionally, Haldane’s original use of
“ectogenesis” predates the common usage of “genetics,” leading to possible confusion of the
terms “ectogenetic” and “genetic.” Despite similar terminology, ectogenesis has no
relationship to genetics, and a fetus’s status as “ectogenetic” has no bearing on its genes or
genetics as commonly defined.
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eliminating pregnancy as a means of improving the human race eugenically through
regulating reproduction.37 “Daedalus” is presented as a historical account of
biological progress throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, tracing the
biological innovations that lead to ectogenesis as standard practice.38 “As we know,
ectogenesis is now universal, and in this country less than 30 per cent of children are
now born of women.”39 While Haldane’s prediction of the end result of experiments
in ectogenesis has not yet come to pass, many of his statements regarding yet-tooccur milestones along the way have been eerily accurate.40
One of Haldane’s predictions that did immediately occur was the vocal outcry in
response to his proposal.41 Over the following six years, five essays were published
in direct response to “Daedalus,” questioning Haldane’s proposals and the
consequences of his predicted developments.42 The most famous product of those
early ectogenesis debates is Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World.43 Juxtaposing the
automation and mass-production principles of Henry Ford’s assembly line with his
predictions for advances in biotechnology, Huxley presents a world in which people
are grown to order, in batches of ninety-six, to fulfill specific roles.44 Specially
tailored to fit the work assigned to them, Huxley’s humans are a chilling set of
inhuman components engineered to fit a niche.45 This dehumanizing picture of
37

HALDANE, supra note 15.

38

Id. at 56.

39

Id. at 65.

40

SQUIER, supra note 33, at 71.
Haldane’s fictional narrative is grounded in a fact . . . Although the other episodes in
this developmental narrative are fictional extrapolations from the state of scientific
knowledge in 1923, they anticipate real developments in reproductive technology
leading up to and including the development of in vitro fertilization. . . Haldane’s story
of the development of in vitro gestation parallels the actual story of the development
of in vitro fertilization, as told in Dr. Robert Edwards’s autobiographical account.
Both narratives move from successes in animal embryology to advances in human
embryology.

Id.
41

HALDANE, supra note 15, at 49. “The biological invention . . . tends to begin as a
perversion and end as a ritual supported by unquestioned beliefs and prejudices.” Id. By
describing a biological innovation as a “perversion,” then showing its commonplace
acceptance, Haldane predicts a separation between sexuality and reproduction in modern
society which did not yet exist. SQUIER, supra note 33, at 70.
42
SQUIER, supra note 33, at 66. These essays established many of the issues still being
discussed over eighty years later regarding ectogenesis. The first, “Lysistrata, or Woman’s
Future and Future Woman,” by Anthony Ludovici, predicts that artificial reproductive
techniques will “defeminize” women and remove gender roles from society. Id. at 75. In
“Hymen, or the Future of Marriage,” Norman Haire predicts that ectogenesis will enable a
select few, specially screened, individuals to provide fertilized embryos for the entire human
race, thus ensuring a superior species through eugenics. Id. at 77.
43

See generally HUXLEY, supra note 2.

44

HUXLEY, supra note 2, at 1, 2.

45

See generally HUXLEY, id.
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ectogenesis warned a generation of the dangers of biotechnology, tabling the debate
for over forty years.46
Modern biotechnology is increasingly close to enabling extrauterine gestation.47
On July 25, 1978, Louise Brown was born the first child of in-vitro fertilization
(IVF), a process by which an egg is fertilized outside of the mother’s uterus and then
implanted.48 On June 15, 1993, the United States Patent Office granted a patent for a
placental chamber – artificial uterus.49 The proposed device is a “[l]ife support
system for a premature baby in which the baby remains attached to its placenta
through its umbilical cord,” and could support a fetus after as little as ten weeks of in
utero gestation.50 In 1997, scientists kept fetal goats alive for the equivalent of one
trimester in extrauterine incubators.51
In Australia, wobbegong sharks are
undergoing experimental in-vitro gestation as part of a conservation effort for nurse
sharks.52 Some experts place human trials of an artificial uterus as close as five years
away.53
For a process to qualify as complete ectogenesis, it must enable development of a
fetus from fertilization to maturity, independent of the mother.54 However, partial
ectogenesis, as an advancement of neonatal care, could enable an extremely
premature fetus to grow to maturity independently of the mother.55 Current advances
enable doctors to regularly deliver and develop children at twenty-four weeks of

46

SQUIER, supra note 33.

47

LaFee, supra note 36.

48

Fergus Walsh, 30th Birthday for First IVF Baby, BBC NEWS, July 14, 2008, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/7505635.stm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
49

U.S. Patent No. 5,218,958 (filed Feb. 21, 1991).

50

958 Patent, at [1]. Such a device would not enable complete ectogenesis because it
would still require that the embryo spend the first ten weeks of development in utero.
However, such a drastic decrease in the amount of time the embryo or fetus spends in a natural
womb would still raise the same questions regarding viability and birth as a completely
ectogenetic process. See Son, supra note 18, at 215.
51

Sakata et. al., supra note 7.

52

Ben Cubby, New Womb to Nurse Species to Life, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Sep. 16,
2008, at 5, available at http://www.smh.com.au/news/conservation/new-womb-to-nursespecies-to-life/2008/09/15/1221330747960.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2009). Wobbegong
sharks, which are not endangered, are being used to test the artificial womb technology for its
eventual use on nurse sharks, which are endangered, and whose young often eat each other in
the womb. Id. Unlike most fish, sharks hatch their eggs inside their bodies, where they grow
until they are large enough to survive outside the womb. Id.
53
Nora Underwood, The Science of Motherhood, TORONTO STAR, May 10, 2008, at ID02
available at http://www.parentcentral.ca/parent/newsfearures/article/423939 (last visited Aug
25, 2009).
54

HALDANE, supra note 15.

55

Lafee, supra note 36. See also ‘958 Patent, supra note 49.
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gestation, and infants with as little as twenty weeks of development have been
delivered with no long-term side effects.56
Because ectogenesis is still a purely theoretical development, certain assumptions
must be made regarding the future technology for the purposes of this Article. In
order to maintain a straightforward analysis, this paper will assume an ectogenetic
method in which an egg is fertilized through IVF (in-vitro fertilization) and then
placed into an artificial uterus for the entirety of its gestational period. At the end of
its development, the fetus is removed from the artificial uterus as a healthy infant,
completely indistinguishable from a child gestated in utero. A natural uterus is not
required or involved during any point in this development.57
Before delving into how the law should treat ectogenetic technology, the reasons
for and against its use should be examined. Some of the proposed reasons for
undergoing ectogenesis include: allowing people (individuals or couples) who could
not otherwise have a child without a surrogate to do so, eliminating the death of the
fetus caused by abortion, and equalizing the reproductive labor between mother and
father.58 Ectogenesis is most appealing as an alternative to surrogacy, without many
of the potential problems involved in a surrogate pregnancy.59 Additionally,
ectogenetic technology may allow for a fetus to be extracted from a pregnant mother
without killing it, enabling abortion without termination.60 Ectogenesis has also been
suggested as the key to sexual equality; because childcare responsibility has always
been biologically linked to women, true equality will only occur once both sexes
have an identical role in reproduction.61

56
“Most-Premature Baby Allowed Home,” BBC News, Feb. 21, 2007, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6384621.stm (last visited Feb. 15, 2009).
57

LaFee, supra note 36. The absence of a natural uterus during any point of gestation is
intended here for simplicity’s sake, and is by no means guaranteed. Ectogenetic processes
could enable a pregnant mother to have the fetus removed from her uterus at a specific point
during pregnancy and placed into an artificial uterus to undergo the remainder of its
development. Many theorists and writers have raised the question of whether such a fetal
extraction technique could, and should, be used in place of abortion, and whether a pregnant
mother would have a right to an abortion if such a technique were available instead. This
particular question is beyond the scope of this Note, which will limit itself to fetuses created
and developed entirely ectogenetically. See generally Gelfand, supra note 31.
58

Peter Singer and Deane Wells, Ectogenesis, in Gelfand & Shook, ECTOGENESIS, supra
note 31, at 18. Singer and Wells also suggest that ectogenesis, combined with genetic
modification or cloning techniques, could be used to create custom-grown organs for
transplantation. It is notable that this suggestion was made in 1985, long before stem cell
research or animal cloning technology.
59

Id. at 11. Such problems include poor health practices on the part of the surrogate
mother, such as alcohol, tobacco, or drug consumption, lack of access to medical records, or a
surrogate’s unwillingness to relinquish the child after birth. See In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
60
61

Singer and Wells, supra note 58, at 12.

Id. See also SHULAMITH FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX: THE CASE FOR FEMINIST
REVOLUTION (William Morrow and Co., 1970).
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Arguments against ectogenesis include the question of effects on mother or child,
or both.62 Because children have always developed in utero, it is impossible to
predict what effects removal from the uterus may have on a fetus.63 The same could
be said of the effect on the mother; a possible bond formed during pregnancy might
be eliminated.64 Finally, fears of embryo abuse, such as the potential for growing an
embryo solely to harvest stem cells or organs from it, lead to a strong objection to
any form of ectogenesis.65
III. CURRENT LAW
Under the current law, the status of the unborn is largely undetermined.66 In Roe
v. Wade,67 the Supreme Court established that the unborn are not persons per se, but
that at some point during gestation, their interests become ‘compelling’ such that
they are entitled to legal protection.68 This point was originally held to be the end of
the second trimester, but was clarified in Planned Parenthood v. Casey69 to be
‘viability’, the point “at which there is a realistic possibility of maintaining and
nourishing a life outside the womb.”70 At that point, “the independent existence of
the second life can in reason and all fairness be the object of state protection that
now overrides the rights of the woman.”71 Pursuant to that doctrine, a fetus is not
entitled to protection until it is developed enough to survive outside the womb, albeit
with aid.72 This viability standard has been semi-successfully attacked recently in
Gonzalez v. Carhart,73 but not overturned.74 However, while pre-viable fetuses are
62

Singer and Wells, supra note 58, at 16.

63

Id.
Suppose that we develop the technical ability to keep an embryo alive and growing
outside its mother’s womb. How could there be any guarantee that the subsequent
child would develop normally? Might there not be some thing, whether chemical or
emotional, that is transmitted from the mother to her child during pregnancy and that
we are unable to detect? Without this element, mightn’t the child be permanently
disadvantaged, physically or mentally?
Id.
64
Id. See also Nancy Breeze, Who is Going to Rock the Petri Dish, in TEST-TUBE
WOMEN: WHAT FUTURE FOR MOTHERHOOD? (Ruth Arditti,et al. eds., 1984).
65

Singer and Wells, supra note 58, at 18.

66

Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27, at 159.

67

Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.

68

Id. at 163.

69

Casey, 505 U.S. 833.

70

Id. at 870.

71

Id.

72

Id. at 860 (acknowledging that medical advances might move the line at which a
developing child is considered “viable”).
73
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 156 (holding that a ban on late-term, “partial-birth” abortions is
Constitutional and does not overly threaten a woman’s right to an abortion, despite not
distinguishing between pre- & post-viability abortions).
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not considered people, they have been extended certain protections normally
reserved for people, such as fetal homicide statutes.75 Courts have held defendants
liable for injury to a pre-viable fetus, as long as it is eventually born alive.76
The status of embryos is even less clear.77 In 1983, after the death of Mario and
Elsa Rios, the probate court was forced to determine whether the two frozen embryos
left by the couple were property to be inherited, or persons capable of inheriting the
couple’s fortune.78 In 1986, Louisiana enacted a statute making embryos juridical
persons and requiring them to be implanted.79 However, several states’ high courts
have held that embryos are not persons, and that their progenitors’ rights in them are
based in property or contract law.80
In Davis v. Davis,81 the Tennessee Supreme Court held that embryos are neither
persons nor property, but “occupy an interim category that entitles them to special
respect because of their potential for human life.”82 Additionally, the Davis Court
recognized that “the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of
equal significance -- the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation.”83 The
negative right of procreation was determined to outweigh the affirmative one if
another avenue exists for the child-seeking party to reproduce.84 The New Jersey
Supreme Court also recognized the negative right of procreation nine years later in
J.B v. M.B.85
74

Id.

75

OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.08 (2008).

76

Torigian v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967); Kalafut v. Gruver, 389
S.E.2d 681 (Va. 1990).
77

Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27, at 160.

78

George P. Smith II, Australia’s Frozen ‘Orphan’ Embryos: A Medical, Legal, and
Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27 (1985).
79

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:121 -133 (2000).

80

See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E. 2d 174 (N.Y. 1988), Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261
(Wash. 2002).
81

842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).

82

Id. at 597. In Davis, an infertile couple had eggs extracted from the wife and fertilized
with the husband’s sperm in vitro. Id. at 591. After a failed implantation of one of the preembryos, the remainder were frozen. Following the couple’s divorce, the ex-wife initially
wanted the pre-embryos implanted in her, but later asked that they be donated to childless
couples. Id. at 592. However, the ex-husband requested an injunction against the pre-embryos
use, and eventually asked that they be destroyed. He wished to prevent himself from
becoming a genetic parent in a situation where he was not able to ensure the safety, security,
and stability of the offspring in a two-parent household, and the Tennessee Supreme Court
sided with him. Id. at 590.
83

Id. at 601.

84

Id. at 604.

85

783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001). In J.B., a couple divorced after having already had one
daughter via IVF. Id. at 710. The husband, M.B., wished to donate the remaining frozen
embryos to childless couples. Id. at 710-11. The wife, J.B., wished to have them destroyed.
Id. at 711. The court, in ordering the embryos destroyed, recognized the absence of a contract
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In short, a fertilized embryo may be, but is not necessarily, considered a person
before it is implanted in a womb. Once it enters the womb, it may have some legal
protection, but it is definitely not considered a “person.”86 When the fetus develops
enough to have a “realistic possibility of maintaining and nourishing a life outside
the womb,” it is considered viable, and the State regains an interest in protecting it.87
Finally, when the infant is born, it is recognized as a person and gains all of the legal
protections entitled to a person and a citizen of the United States.88
IV. PROBLEMS WHEN ECTOGENESIS IS APPLIED TO THE CURRENT LAW
The conflicts between modern abortion law, the legal status of fetuses and
embryos, and developing technology will give rise to uncountable disputes regarding
control over and interest in developing ectogenetic fetuses. These questions include:
1)
whether either parent could choose to have an ectogenetic fetus terminated,
and whether they would need the consent of the other parent, or the state,
to do so.

for disposition between the two, as well as M.B.’s ability to father children at a later date.
Citing Davis v. Davis, the court held that:
M.B.'s right to procreate is not lost if he is denied an opportunity to use or donate the
preembryos. M.B. is already a father and is able to become a father to additional
children, whether through natural procreation or further in vitro fertilization. In
contrast, J.B.'s right not to procreate may be lost through attempted use or through
donation of the preembryos. Implantation, if successful, would result in the birth of
her biological child and could have life-long emotional and psychological
repercussions . . . Her fundamental right not to procreate is irrevocably extinguished if
a surrogate mother bears J.B.'s child. We will not force J.B. to become a biological
parent against her will.
Id. at 717.
86

Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 .

87

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 870.

88

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. While the status of embryos has been largely left
unexamined in the United States, that is not necessarily the case elsewhere. “In 1982, spurred
by the birth four years earlier of the first ‘test-tube’ baby, the British government established
the Warnock Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology.” SQUIER,
supra note 33, at 63. The Warnock Committee ran a broad investigation into the future of
reproductive technology, and in 1984, issued their recommendations to the government. Id.
After six years of debate, Parliament passed the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill,
whose chief provision was to limit experimentation on human embryos to fourteen days from
fertilization. Id. While the provisions of the Bill may come from numerous sources, the
Warnock Committee makes their feelings on ectogenesis clear:
We appreciate why the possibility of such a technique arouses so much anxiety. There
are however two points to make about this. First, such developments are well into the
future, certainly beyond the time horizon within which this Inquiry feels it can predict.
Secondly, our recommendation is that the growing of a human embryo in vitro beyond
fourteen days should be a criminal offense.
Id. at 64, quoting MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY, 71-72 (Basil Blackwell ed., Oxford Press) 1985.
Ironically, the Report specifically disclaims predictive ability while advising the outlawing of
a procedure it only predicts will exist. SQUIER, supra note 33, at 63.
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whether a child developed ectogenetically is considered “born,” and if so,
when that birth takes place.
whether a child developing ectogenetically is considered “viable,” under
Roe, and if so, when it becomes so.
A. Termination Rights Over an Ectogenetic Fetus.

If a couple were to undergo IVF and begin developing a baby ectogenetically,
only to divorce later, there is a question as to whether either party could choose to
have the fetus terminated, and whether it could be done against the express wishes of
the other.89 Under current abortion law, a fetus can be terminated until the point that
it becomes “viable outside the womb.”90 However, since ectogenesis causes the
entirety of fetal development to take place outside the womb, there is never any point
during development at which the ectogenetic fetus could be terminated.91 The
current law vests the right to terminate a fetus entirely in the pregnant woman, whose
choice is only weighed against the state’s interests, not those of any other
individual.92 Conversely, the Davis Court recognized that a negative reproductive
right (the right not to be a genetic parent) exists.93 This right can supersede an
affirmative right, and is not limited to the mother.94 This right creates a strong
foundation for the case that either parent should be allowed to terminate the
ectogenetic fetus’ development, regardless of the other’s consent.95
Furthermore, much of the rationale for abortion comes from the mother’s right to
privacy and control of her own body.96 If the fetus is independent of the mother’s
body, thereby removing the privacy factor from consideration of termination, the
“State’s interests in protecting health and potential life” could outweigh the negative
reproductive rights of either parents, or both.97 In other words, the State could be
justified in forcing a parent to bring an ectogenetic fetus to term, while a fetus in

89

See Christina L. Misner, What if Mary Sue Wanted an Abortion Instead? The Effect of
Davis v. Davis on Abortion Rights, 3 AM. U.J. GENDER & L. 265 (1995). Misner contrasts the
central holding in Davis, freedom from unwanted reproduction, with the trends in abortion law
restricting freedom to terminate, and advocates that abortion law should be based on the same
negative right of genetic parentage as Davis. Misner argues that “[t]here is something just a
touch spooky here. As women's reproductive rights are contracting, men's rights seem to be
expanding.” Id. at 285. But see J.B., 783 A.2d at 716 (recognizing a woman’s negative right
of genetic parentage regarding frozen embryos).
90

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.

91

Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, at 397.

92

Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.

93

Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 588. See also J.B., 783 A.2d at 717 (recognizing that a woman’s
right not to be a genetic parent warranted the destruction of her frozen embryos over the
father’s objections when he was capable of fathering future children).
94

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.

95

Misner, supra note 89, at 299.

96

Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.

97

Id. at 156.
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utero at the same stage of development would still be subject to an abortion.98 No
court has ever weighed State interests in fetal health and life against negative
reproductive interests, rather than privacy in one’s own body, and such a balancing
test might very well end by finding that the State interests dominate, thereby
necessitating the fetus be brought to term.99 If this were to be the case, it would be
necessary to determine who pays for the fetus’ development and is responsible for
the child.
B. Birth and the Ectogenetic Fetus
Next, ectogenesis will force a re-evaluation of the question of when a fetus
becomes a person.100 The word “birth” is defined as “[t]he complete extrusion of a
newborn baby from the mother's body.”101 Unfortunately, this definition falls short
in two very important ways:

98

Id.

99

Misner, supra note 89, at 296-97.

100

Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, at 393.

101

Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 9.
In a few jurisdictions, the state of the law may be changing. In South Carolina, for
example, a child does not have to be born alive to be a victim of murder; a woman can
be convicted of fetal murder if her baby is stillborn because of the mother's prenatal
drug abuse.
Id. This brings up the interesting question of who is responsible for a developing ectogenetic
fetus. Even before a fetus is viable, the state maintains an interest in protecting the life of the
future child. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162. This interest is reflected in fetal homicide statutes and
other laws designed to protect fetuses in utero from injury and death. See OHIO REV. CODE.
ANN. §§ 2903.01-2903.08 (2008). Ensuring that a fetus developing ectogenetically is protected
similarly should not be a very difficult task, but does present certain unique challenges that
have not yet been addressed. One such issue lies in the assignment of responsibility to
caretakers of the ectogenetic fetus. Traditionally, responsibility for a fetus in utero has been
split between the pregnant mother, her neonatal physician, and outside factors (such as a
tortfeasor to the fetus). See Roland F. Chase, Annotation, Liability for Prenatal Injuries, 40
A.L.R.3d 1222 (2008). However, ectogenesis will force a reevaluation of that responsibility,
as the pregnant mother is no longer the sole and total conduit between the fetus and the outside
world. As a result, more, if not all, of the responsibility for the fetus’s care and well-being
will fall on the attending physician and ectogenetic facility.
Under the current law, pregnant mothers have been held criminally liable for danger and
damage to their fetus during pregnancy, primarily as a result of drug use. See e.g., BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9; see also James G. Hodge, Jr., Annotation, Prosecution of
mother for prenatal substance abuse based on endangerment of or delivery of controlled
substance to child, 70 A.L.R.5th 461 (2008). Because an ectogenetic fetus is not linked
through an umbilical cord to an individual the same way a fetus in utero is, it does not face the
same danger of drug damage from its host. However, it still may be subject to harm as a result
of negligent or criminal conduct on the part of the caretaking facility, and lawmakers must
recognize the responsibility such a facility takes when it agrees to shoulder the burden of care
for an ectogenetic fetus. Federal and state regulation will need to be enacted to ensure that
ectogenetic care facilities take adequate precaution in caring for their charges, while at the
same time recognizing that the technology will be experimental for a long time, with all of the
unavoidable risks inherent in medical experimentation. See generally Joyce M. Raskin and
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1)

The definition does not establish a level of development at which a baby is
distinguished from a fetus, and the definition of fetus is unhelpful in that
regard.102
2)
The definition only encompasses a baby that has been extruded from its
mother.103
If a baby is only distinguished from a fetus by its removal from the mother’s
body, then any point at which a developing fetus is removed from the mother and
placed into an artificial uterus could be considered as having constituted “birth.”104
In this case, a fetus developing ectogenetically would be far more protected than one
developing in utero, because it would be considered a fully-fledged, natural-born
person from the moment of its removal.105 On the other hand, ectogenesis presents
the possibility of developing a baby without having ever been inside the mother’s
body.106 The current definition of birth would exclude such a child from having ever
been born.107
In this case, children developed ectogenetically would face several problems
asserting themselves fully under the United States Constitution. First, an argument
could be made that no child of ectogenesis can be considered “natural-born,” thus
removing them from qualification for President of the United States.108 However, all
disputes over the term “natural-born” have arisen from whether it applies to someone
born to American citizens abroad, and not due to process of birth itself.109 Second,
and more importantly, the Constitution only recognizes persons “born or naturalized
in the United States” as citizens.110 If a child of ectogenesis is considered born when
it is removed from its mother, citizenship would be conferred on a still-developing
fetus and thereby conflict with Roe.111 Therefore, there must be a point in fetal
development, regardless of the medium, at which the child is considered legally born
in order to qualify as a citizen.112
Nadav A. Mazor, The Artificial Womb and Human Subject Research, in Gelfand & Shook,
ECTOGENESIS, supra note 31, at 160-181.
102

“A developing but unborn mammal, especially in the latter stages of development.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
103

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9.

104

Id.

105

See Berg, Elephants and Embryos, supra note 16, at 398.

106

See LaFee, supra note 36.

107

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9.

108

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. “No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of
the United States at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office
of President.” Id.
109
Carl Hulse, McCain’s Canal Zone Birth Prompts Queries About Whether That Rules
Him Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/28/us/
politics/28mccain.html.
110

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.

111

Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.

112

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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C. Viability and Ectogenesis
One of the most pressing issues is to reconcile the legal protections available to a
developing fetus regardless of the location in which it is developing. It would be
unfair to use two sets of rules for two fetuses at the exact same stage of development,
simply because of the environment in which they are developing, without a sound
legal reason for the difference. Under the current law, a fetus developing in utero is
not a person according to Roe,113 while an equally-developed ectogenetic fetus would
either have been expelled from the womb, and hence born under the common
definition, or never implanted, and thus possibly be a “juridical person” under
statutory definition.114 It is far more consistent to draw a line in the developmental
process of a fetus at which it is a person, regardless of the method of development,
and entitled to all the rights and privileges thereof.115 The Casey Court attempted to
draw such a line when they established “viability” as the point at which the State’s
interest in preserving fetal life justifies banning an abortion.116 However, the
definition used by the Court for “viable” failed to address whether technological aid
constituted viability, although they did recognize that viability could be reached
earlier through neonatal technological progress.117
V. WAYS TO ADAPT THE LAW TO ACCOMMODATE ECTOGENETIC TECHNOLOGY
A. Property Theory as Applies to Developing Fetuses
The most important change necessary to reconciling ectogenetic advances with
the current law is the application of property theory to embryos and fetuses.118
Ectogenetic technology will allow for an unprecedented disconnect between a
mother and her developing fetus, which must be recognized by firmly establishing
the legal status of fetuses.119 The Supreme Court has already recognized certain
personal rights in a pre-viable fetus, precluding the option of recognizing a
developing fetus purely as property.120 However, the central holding of Roe still
maintains that fetuses are not persons until they are born.121
113

Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.

114

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §9:121-133 (2009).

115

Son, supra note 18, at 231.

116

Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860. Note that viability is not the only imaginable threshold for
determining whether abortion is allowable. Under French law, “virtually any pregnant woman
can get a legal abortion during the first ten weeks of pregnancy. All abortions must be
preceded by a discussion between the woman and a counselor.” LAURENCE TRIBE, ABORTION:
THE CLASH OF THE ABSOLUTES 73 (1992). This fixed ten week standard is independent of the
level of fetal development, and is instead meant to give the pregnant mother adequate time to
consider her condition and make an informed decision. Son, supra note 18 at 223.
117

Casey, 505 U.S. at 870.

118

Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27.

119
Son, supra note 18 (advocating the use of the Davis doctrine of the negative right to
genetic parenthood in the Supreme Court’s consideration of the viability standard).
120

See Carhart, 550 U.S. at 124.

121

Roe, 410 U.S. at 158 .
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Recognizing a fetus as property, regardless of its form of development, would
allow the courts to use an existing and long-standing body of law to settle disputes
and allocate rights over both ectogenetic and in utero fetuses.122 This recognition
would enable parents to create binding contracts with adopting parents and custodial
physicians, as well as providing for disposition in the case of death or divorce.123
Additionally, if ectogenetic technology were to allow a developing fetus to be
removed from an injured or dying mother, treatment of the fetus as property would
ease a court’s determination of its disposition.124
Labor theory of property (the doctrine that one has a natural right to ownership
over one’s own creations) also makes room for the special relationship between a
fetus in utero and the pregnant mother.125 The labor and investment a pregnant
mother makes in her child could be considered such a personal aspect of the creation
of the child that it justifies maintaining the complete control over termination rights
established in Roe, even in the face of competing property rights.126 The likely and
logical decision, therefore, is that while all developing fetuses should be considered
property, the unique strains and concerns placed on a woman during pregnancy
create an interest in a naturally-developing fetus that supersedes both parents’
property interests, and both the affirmative and negative procreative rights of the
father.127 This interest is strong enough to justify complete control by the mother,
including the right to unilaterally terminate, over a fetus developing naturally, up
until the point at which the fetus is considered legally viable.128
B. Parents’ Reproductive Rights
The next question raised by ectogenesis is whether, if a fetus is developing
ectogenetically, the father has the same interests and is entitled to the same control
over it as the mother.129 The current view of abortion law is that a pregnant woman
has both an affirmative and negative right to childbirth, neither of which can be

122

Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27.

123

Id.

124

Id.

125

Id.

126

Son, supra note 18.

127

Misner, supra note 89.
Davis fits nicely into the abortion context as a long-lost recognition of a woman's right
not to procreate, upholding the proper level of heightened respect for women's rights
to bodily privacy. The court in Davis was able to draw an equal framework of
procreational rights simply because the other right implicated by abortion decisions the right to control one's own body - was not at stake. The object of debate was in a
neutral petri dish. That is why the man's interest in Davis was given equal treatment.
Otherwise, "a woman's stronger, competing interest in controlling her body" should
overshadow procreational autonomy. Davis simply strengthens the importance of the
right not to procreate.
Id. at 297.
128

Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.

129

Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 588.
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legally curtailed by anybody, including the father.130 “If the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”131 However, the majority of the
justification and rationale for this right stems from a woman’s right to control over
her own body by preventing or aborting pregnancy.132 If a fetus is growing
ectogenetically, independent of its mother’s body, then control over it must stem
from her interest in it as a progenitor, which is equal to that of the father.133
The Davis Court established that a person’s right to not be a genetic parent
outweighs another person’s right to be one if another course of action is available. 134
If the principle also applies to an ectogenetically developing fetus, then both parents
have the same reproductive interests in the fetus and either one could choose to
unilaterally terminate it.135 Ultimately, this would protect a naturally-developing
fetus far more than an ectogenetically developing one.136 Under the current law, the
right to terminate a fetus in utero lies entirely with the pregnant mother, whereas
under the Davis negative reproductive right an ectogenetic fetus would be subject to
termination from either parent without the consent of the other.137
On the other hand, treating an ectogenetically developing fetus as property would
be interpreted as requiring both parents’ consent before the fetus is terminated.138
Under property theory, if both parents have equal interests in the fetus, one parent
could relinquish his or her rights to it (such as in the case of divorce) by intent or
130

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).

131

Id. (emphasis in original).

132

Casey, 505 U.S. at 852
The mother who carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical
constraints, to pain that only she must bear. That these sacrifices have from the
beginning of the human race been endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in
the eyes of others and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for
the State to insist she make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for
the State to insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman's role, however
dominant that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny
of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual
imperatives and her place in society.
Id.
133

See Misner, supra note 89.
[B]oth Davis and the abortion cases implicate the right to privacy as embodied in the
right to procreational autonomy, which is unrelated to whether the egg is growing in
the woman's body, or preserved in a petri dish. Potential life is potential life; the
decision to become a parent resides with both parents, or at least with the mother
contemplating abortion.
Id. at 298.
134

Davis, 842 S.W. 2d at 601; see also Son, supra note 18.

135

See Son, supra note 18.

136

Id.

137

Casey, 505 U.S. at 852; Davis 842 S.W.2d at 600.

138

Berg, Owning Persons, supra note 27.
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constructive abandonment, but not actively seek to destroy it without the other
party’s consent.139
This requirement of mutual consent would protect an
ectogenetically-developing fetus far more than a naturally-developing one, which
under Roe can be terminated unilaterally by the mother.140 This solution would
preserve the pregnant mother’s rights to terminate a fetus growing in utero, while
requiring both parents’ consent to terminate an ectogenetic fetus.
C. “Birth” and “Viability”
The next question is whether an ectogenetic fetus can be considered born, and if
so, when that birth takes place. For the purposes of the Constitution, a person must
be born to be a citizen.141 If an embryo is created in vitro, then grown
ectogenetically into an infant, a strong argument could be made that, having never
been fully “extru[ded] from the mother’s body,” it was never born.142 In order to
avoid this interpretation, states should statutorily recognize all fetuses that have
reached legal viability as having been born, regardless of the method of their
development. Making “born” synonymous with “viable” will, in addition to
protecting ectogenetic fetuses, eliminate the current gray area in reproductive rights
between viability and birth, in which a fetus is protected by compelling state interests
but is not yet a person.143
Therefore, states must establish a point in fetal development at which the fetus is
considered legally viable.144 Under Casey, viability was recognized at approximately

139

Id.

140

Roe, 410 U.S. at 113.

141

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV., § 1. Note that being “born” and being “viable” are two
different criteria, although they appear similar. “Birth” takes place when the fetus is
“complete[ly] extrude[ed]. . . from the mother’s body.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 9. At that point, it becomes a fully-fledged person and is entitled to the rights of one.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. On the other hand, a fetus is entitled to state protection once it attains
viability, the point at which it is “capab[le] of meaningful life outside the mother’s womb.”
Casey, 505 U.S. at 930. One of the key elements of adapting the law to ectogenesis will be to
establish that the developmental point at which a fetus is “viable” and “born” should be the
same, and eliminate the legal gray area that currently exists while a fetus is viable but not yet
born. See Patricia A. King, The Juridical Status of the Fetus: A Proposal for Legal Protection
of the Unborn, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1647, 1648, 1687 (1976) (arguing that viability should merit
personhood, and that unborn viable fetuses merit all legal protections afforded to human
beings).
142

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 9.

143

Roe, 410 U.S. at 158. But see Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158 (stating that “the abortion
methods [the Partial Birth Abortion Ban] proscribed had a ‘disturbing similarity to the killing
of a newborn infant,’ and thus it was concerned with ‘draw[ing] a bright line that clearly
distinguishes abortion and infanticide’.” (Internal citations omitted)). Carhart held for the
first time that the state’s legitimate interest in protecting the life of a fetus extends to the
method of abortion, regardless of whether the fetus is viable or not at the time. This indicates
a period during fetal development at which a pre-viable fetus is not entitled to protection from
termination but is entitled to protection regarding the method of termination. Id. at 160.
144

Son, supra note 18, at 215-16.
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twenty-three to twenty-four weeks of development.145 However, Justice O’Connor
underscored that recognition:
The soundness or unsoundness of that constitutional judgment in no sense
turns on whether viability occurs at approximately 28 weeks, as was usual
at the time of Roe, at 23 to 24 weeks, as it sometimes does today, or at
some moment even slightly earlier in pregnancy, as it may if fetal
respiratory capacity can somehow be enhanced in the future.146
Justice O’Connor’s statement undermines an earlier assumption that “the threshold
of fetal viability is, and will remain, no different from what it was at the time Roe
was decided.”147 Ectogenesis will contradict that assumption by having a fetus that
was created independently of the mother’s uterus.148
There are three possible interpretations of viability that could be applied to an
ectogenetic fetus, each with its own benefits and drawbacks. The first is that,
because an ectogenetic fetus exists independently of the mother from the moment of
fertilization, it is viable throughout its entire development.149 This is a textualist
interpretation of viability, because it adheres most closely to the holdings of both
Roe and Casey in that a fetus is only a person once it is capable of meaningful life
outside the womb.150 While the definition of “meaningful” might be bandied around,
there is no question that ectogenesis would render a fetus capable of life outside the
womb, independent of its mother.151 Recognizing this reality, the Court would have
no choice but to recognize the ectogenetic fetus as an independent entity from the
moment of fertilization.
Under a second interpretation, the “naturalist approach,” a fetus is considered
viable outside the womb only when it can survive without ectogenetic assistance.152
This supports the underlying assumption of the Supreme Court in the Roe decision,
that ectogenesis would not be a consideration in the near future and that a mostlydeveloped fetus is close enough to being an infant as to warrant state protection.153
The final interpretation of viability, the “advanced development approach,” views
a fetus, both ectogenetic and in utero, as viable once it reaches a certain point in pre-
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natal development.154 This interpretation is the only definition of viability that gives
equal standing to both in vitro and in utero development, recognizing that
ectogenesis will render the terms “born,” “viable,” and even “abortion” functionally
obsolete. Using the definition above will allow parents155 to abort a developing
ectogenetic fetus before it reaches the viability threshold, but still protect viable
fetuses in accordance with the principles set forth in Roe and Casey. The proper
threshold of viability should be viewed in terms of advanced fetal development.156
Currently, most physicians consider “viability” right now to be at approximately
twenty-two weeks of development, but children have been born after as little as
twenty weeks of gestation without long-term defects.157 Congressional hearings from
expert witnesses in the fields of neonatal care and obstetrics are the fairest and most
likely method of determining exactly where such a line should be drawn, and it is
almost certain that both sides of the abortion debate will be present to make their
opinions known.
VI. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM ADAPTING THE LAW TO ACCOMMODATE ECTOGENESIS
A. People or Property
There are numerous and understandable objections to classifying developing
fetuses as property. First, deeming a human being at any stage of development as
“property” could be an uncomfortable reminder of slavery in the United States.
While no one plans on enslaving a developing fetus, the comparison is not entirely
without merit. The original precedent in which a person could also be property,
Dred Scott v. Sandford,158 was overruled by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, prohibiting involuntary servitude and extending citizenship to all
persons born in the United States.159 However, neither one explicitly prevents a
human being from being considered property before birth.160
Additionally, courts’ reticence in recognizing surrogacy agreements indicates a
strong objection to any form of property-based outlook on human beings.161 While
the relevant surrogacy cases have dealt exclusively with infants, rather than fetuses,
some courts may consider the distinction trivial. Furthermore, the different treatment
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of surrogacy agreements from state to state leaves the question of interest in, and
ownership of, an ectogenetic fetus uncertain.162
Also, surrogacy cases provide a glimpse at the question of to whom an
ectogenetic fetus may belong. Surrogacy cases have recognized a birth mother’s
parental interest in a child of different genetic parents,163 in spite of a contractual
waiver. While an ectogenetic fetus lacks a birth mother by definition, this
recognition establishes the questionable validity of an interest in the child by
someone other than the genetic parents. In states where a surrogacy contract is held
to be valid, a set of genetic parents could contractually transfer their parental interest
to adoptive parents.164 However, in states where surrogacy contracts are considered
void or voidable, a pair of genetic parents with no intent on raising a child could be
forced into doing so by an adoptive parent who reneges on their contract, knowing
that it might not be enforceable.
However, the more likely problem with extending surrogacy contract invalidity
to ectogenetic adoption arises when genetic parents arrange to have their fetus grown
ectogenetically on behalf of a contracted adopter, but ultimately change their mind
and decide to raise the child themselves. This situation is where a property analysis
can be helpful, even if not used exclusively, by weighing the traditional forms of
property interests in the fetus, such as labor and investment, “title” (in this case, in
the form of an adoption contract), and even “utility” (in the sense that one set of
parents may provide a healthier upbringing, increasing the chances of the child
becoming a productive member of society).
B. Changing the Definitions of Birth and Viability
Reconciling birth with viability will require changing the law to recognize postviable fetuses as full persons, even while they are still in a natural or artificial
womb.165 This may impact a mother’s medical options during late pregnancy,
because the child will have the same rights and interests as the mother, whereas the
present balance is between the mother’s interests and the future infant, not the
current fetus.166 However, as many states already consider viable fetuses full persons
for the purpose of civil and criminal liability, a change in the law regarding them is
unlikely to effect significant change.167 On the other hand, tying the legal definition
162
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of birth into that of viability will require that the issue of viability be thoroughly
settled.
Questions arise from each of the above definitions of viability, each of which
must be addressed before determining what protections are available to an
ectogenetic fetus before it attains that status. The most difficult problems arise under
the textualist approach, wherein a fetus is considered viable, and hence protected
from termination, once it is capable of life independent of the mother.168 Because
ectogenesis allows independence from the mother at any time during fetal
development, including fertilization, the textualist approach forces all ectogenetic
embryos and fetuses to be protected by state interests from termination.169 This
outcome would most likely please the “Right to Life” movement because it would
eliminate the primary objection of the anti-abortion stance: the death of the fetus.170
However, it would also have the most far-reaching ramifications on society and the
law.171 If an ectogenetic fetus is a person, the question arises why a fetus in utero is
not one, as well.172 A court could also find that ectogenetic fetuses are a protected
class under the Equal Protection Clause.173 A key element to determining if a group
is a suspect class, entitled to protection from discrimination, is whether its status
stems from circumstances beyond their control.174 To a fetus, whose existence is
dependent entirely on a mother or an artificial ectogenetic device, all circumstances
would be beyond its control. A court could therefore decide that equal protection
does apply to fetuses, and that ectogenetic and in utero fetuses must have the same
set of protections applied. Therefore, all fetuses have a right to protection from
termination.175 Establishing fetal rights from fertilization would be a complete
reversal of Roe by establishing fetuses as persons, and could go so far as to require
women to accept ectogenetic gestation in lieu of an abortion.176 Such a ruling would
require the government to create, maintain, and regulate a system to maintain nearly
168
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a million unwanted fetuses per year, not to mention finding caretakers for those
children once they reach birth maturity.177
The naturalist approach, in which a fetus is only viable once it reaches the point
at which it can survive without ectogenetic technology, is too vague to be truly
applicable.178 This approach maintains the spirit of Roe by allowing a parent to
terminate a fetus before it can survive unassisted.179 However, both Roe and Casey
account for the possibility that technology can push back the date of viability for a
fetus.180 Furthermore, as ectogenetic research is primarily a refinement of existing
neonatal respiratory and incubation technology, attempting to distinguish between
ectogenetic technology and assistance for premature infants would be difficult and
futile.181
Finally, while the advanced development approach is the standard that best
preserves the delicate balance established in Roe, establishing viability based on a
specific point in fetal development is not without its problems. First, the moment
during gestation at which a fetus is considered “advanced” is difficult to pinpoint,
and will require significant amounts of input from the medical community.182 Based
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on current medical knowledge, “advanced development” is likely to have occurred
between twenty and twenty-eight weeks after fertilization.183
Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court has already specifically
overturned a specific point in development (the trimester system, established in
Roe184) in favor of the broader “viability” test.185 Returning to the rigid
developmental timeline established in Roe could be considered an erosion of
abortion rights, especially after the recent upholding of the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban, which outlawed certain pre-viability abortions.186
Even with the obstacles inherent in the advanced development interpretation of
viability, it is the only one that allows for a reasonable compromise between state
interests in ensuring that a developing fetus is born, and those of prospective parents
who do not wish to become actual parents.187 Despite almost-certain objections from
both sides of the abortion debate to such a compromise solution (pro-abortion
activists opposing the return to a “bright-line” standard as opposed to “viability,” and
anti-abortion activists opposing the right to voluntarily terminate an ectogenetically
developing fetus), it is still the best way to maintain the rights and protections
established in Roe and Casey. This solution also recognizes and protects the
negative reproductive rights espoused in Davis by preventing people from being
forced into becoming unwilling genetic parents.188
C. Equal Treatment for Equal Levels of Development
Once an ectogenetic fetus is determined to be viable, and thus constitutionally
protected from termination, the law must still grapple with the inconsistencies
between treatment of pre-viable ectogenetic fetuses and pre-viable fetuses in utero.
The treatment of a pre-viable ectogenetic fetus as property, as described in the last
section, must be reconciled with the legal limbo in which a pre-viable fetus in utero
currently stands.189 Specifically, courts will need to determine whether the property
law which would apply to ectogenetic fetuses and require both parents’ consent
before terminating the fetus, would apply to those growing in utero as well. If it
does, then an in utero fetus would be considered as much the property of the father
as of the mother, requiring his consent before termination. This would undercut the
unilateral right of a mother to have an abortion established in Roe.190
Alternatively, a court could determine that the privacy and negative reproductive
rights of a mother established in Roe for a fetus in utero apply to those growing
ectogenetically. Because a mother acting unilaterally can terminate a fetus growing
183
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in her uterus, she should have that same right towards a fetus growing
ectogenetically. The court would then have to examine the protection of the
ectogenetic fetus compared to the rights of the mother under a very different
balancing test than courts have used up until now to evaluate abortion rights.
Previously, courts have weighed the State’s interest in protecting nascent life against
the mother’s interest in the privacy of her own body.191 In a debate over an
ectogenetic fetus, the mother’s right to terminate would have to stem not from her
control over her body, but from her right against being an unwilling progenitor.192
This question strikes at one of the central issues of the abortion-rights debate, one
which has been almost, but not entirely, purely academic until now: whether the right
to an abortion comes from a woman’s right not to be pregnant, or her right not to be
a mother.193 While no court has addressed this issue as it pertains to the abortion
debate, the Davis holding supports a person’s right not to be an unwilling genetic
parent.194 However, Davis only extends to embryos, over whose life no state has
attempted to assert an interest in court.195 In order to truly determine the value of the
negative reproductive right, it must be weighed not against a co-parent’s affirmative
right, but against the state’s interest in nascent life. If the negative reproductive right
is recognized and found to outweigh the State’s interests in protecting nascent health,
then a mother’s unilateral abortion rights expand to include an ectogenetic fetus.196
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However, if the court decides that the State’s interests in protecting prenatal life
outweigh the negative parental right, it would necessitate that an ectogenetic fetus
could not be terminated. This creates another situation in which a system would
have to be established for caring for unwanted ectogenetic fetuses, requiring the
State to either force the parents to maintain them and see to the eventual infant’s
care, or to take responsibility for the fetuses itself. Alternatively, the State could
create criteria under which an ectogenetic fetus is subject to termination, such as the
onset of visible defects during development.197 If such a requirement were to be
instituted, it would raise the legitimate question of why ectogenetic fetuses need a
reason for termination, thus entitling them to heightened protection, while fetuses in
utero are not. Unless a reason for such protection could be found, this would once
again create a scenario in which Roe is fully overturned in favor of the State’s
interest in protecting prenatal life.
VII. CONCLUSION
There are no easy answers to the questions that will be raised by the advent of
ectogenesis, but that does not mean they should not be asked before technology
makes it necessary to answer them. Advancements in neonatal technology are
occurring at an alarming rate, and it is only a matter of years before Huxley’s vision
of people without pregnancy becomes a real possibility.198 If we wait until
ectogenetic technology is upon us before delving into its legal ramifications, we run
the risk of a court or legislature making a snap decision that affects the reproductive
rights of millions.
The first necessary step is to establish a firm legal categorization of embryos and
fetuses, based on their stage of development.199 Embryos and pre-viable fetuses must
be acknowledged as property, even if some protections not normally granted to
property are extended to them.200 Fetuses that have reached viability must be
recognized as full persons and citizens, protected by the state.201 Eliminating this
ambiguity will maintain a level of equality between fetuses developing
ectogenetically and those in utero, without providing special treatment for one group
or the other.
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This categorization will solidify the rights of parents regarding a pre-viable
ectogenetic fetus. Recognizing such a fetus as property enables parents to share and
maintain control equally over the ectogenetic fetus for the purposes of termination,
transferability, and disposition.202 While this recognition establishes significant
differences between each parent’s rights when dealing with an ectogenetic fetus as
opposed to one in utero, these differences can be justified by the unique relationship
between a pregnant mother and the fetus growing inside of her. This relationship
substantiates the pregnant mother’s sole right of termination found in Roe and Casey,
while denying such unilateral authority in the case of an ectogenetic fetus, where her
rights as a progenitor are on the same footing as those of the father.203
The next necessary step is to remove the legal distinctions between viability and
birth by recognizing any post-viable fetus as a person and having been born for legal
purposes. This will eliminate the gray area currently occupied by a viable unborn
fetus, in which the government has a recognized interest in protecting it but it is not
yet recognized as a person. Acknowledging viable fetuses, regardless of their
medium, as being people will keep the law consistent without causing any major
changes in its application.204
In order to recognize viable fetuses, however, it is necessary to clarify what it
means to be ectogenetically viable.205 At least three possible interpretations of
viability could be established, each with its own advantages and drawbacks. A
“textualist” interpretation adheres most closely to the definition set forth in Roe,
under which a fetus is viable when it is capable of independence from its mother,
regardless of its stage of development.206 Ectogenesis creates significant problems
with this interpretation because it would render the fetus viable throughout its entire
developmental cycle, making it a person from the moment of fertilization and
unlawful to terminate at any stage. A “naturalist” interpretation would recognize a
fetus as viable once it is capable of life independent of both its mother and
ectogenetic assistance.207 However, the vague nature of “ectogenetic assistance” as
different from modern neonatal care is a largely semantic distinction, and would be
difficult to clarify.208 Finally, an “advanced development” interpretation of viability
recognizes a fetus as being viable once it has reached an advanced stage of growth,
regardless of the environment in which it is growing.209 While several different
points of growth could be recognized as “advanced,” the most reasonable benchmark
to use would be sentience, at approximately twenty-two weeks of gestation.210
Sentience would be the earliest point at which a fetus could feel pain or discomfort,
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and thus have a legitimate interest in avoiding them.211 Recognizing advanced
development and viability at sentience preserves the right to terminate established in
Roe, and extends that right to the parents of an ectogenetic fetus.
None of these suggested changes to the law should be undertaken lightly, as each
carries foreseeable problems. Careless understanding of the differences between
ectogenetic fetuses and those in utero, or an overly broad definition of viability,
could be used as justification for completely overturning the balance of rights
between parent and fetus established in Roe.212 However, change to the way we
make babies as a result of scientific breakthrough is inevitable, and the law must
adapt to it.
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